- All articles

All articles

- Israel’s euphoric ‘victory’ over Iran is quickly giving way to disillusionment

- Skating through rubble: The volunteers reclaiming joy for Gaza’s children

- What the UAE hopes to gain from Israel’s growing isolation

- 12 days that brought the war home to Israelis

- Why everything Israelis think they know about Iran is wrong

- With Iran war as pretext, Israel suffocates the West Bank

- Netanyahu’s Iran gambit aimed to realign the world behind Israel. It may backfire

- Unprotected from Iranian missiles, Palestinians in Israel decry neglect

MERON RAPOPORT || JUN 27, 2025, 3:21 PM EDT || SOURCE

Israel’s euphoric ‘victory’ over Iran is quickly giving way to disillusionment

Politically, Netanyahu may appear the winner of the '12-Day War.' But Israel achieved none of its military goals, and Gaza is once again impossible to ignore.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the scene where an Iranian ballistic missile hit and caused damage at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, June 20, 2025. (Itai Ron/Pool)

In partnership with

“Can we say this is the greatest victory in the history of the State of Israel?” This is what a host on Israel’s Channel 12 asked retired Israeli army General Giora Eiland — father of the so-called “Generals’ Plan” to starve and ethnically cleanse Gaza’s northernmost cities — some two hours after the ceasefire between Israel and Iran took effect on June 24. Eiland was modest. The victory in the 1967 war was bigger, he reassured the anchor, but this was certainly a tremendous achievement.

As someone old enough to remember the euphoria following the 1967 war, I can’t deny the echoes between the Six-Day War and this “12-Day War” with Iran: the same collective relief that a perceived existential threat was supposedly eliminated, the same disdain and mockery directed at the enemy’s performance, the same overwhelming pride in Israel’s military prowess — paired with the belief that such a victory secures the country’s future for decades to come.

But as history reminds us, the war of June 1967 wasn’t Israel’s last. Far from it. In many ways, it marked the beginning of a new era of bloodshed. The current war in Gaza, and perhaps the war with Iran as well, can be seen as a direct continuation of that “glorious triumph.”

It took years after 1967 for Israelis to grasp that the war hadn’t ushered in the transformation they had hoped for. This time, the disillusionment set in almost immediately. Mere hours after U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly announced the ceasefire, it was already apparent that victory over Iran was unlikely to end Israel’s conflict with the Islamic Republic, let alone all of its future wars.

In the early hours of Sunday morning, right after the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared, “I promised you that Iran’s nuclear facilities would be destroyed, one way or another. That promise has been fulfilled.” In a televised address, Trump echoed that sentiment, claiming the sites were “totally obliterated” in the Saturday night airstrike.

The Iranians, meanwhile, countered that they had removed most of the enriched uranium from Fordow before the attack, while a CNN report citing U.S. intelligence sources revealed that the strike had likely delayed Iran’s nuclear program by “a few months” at best. Given that the war’s stated goal was to eliminate the immediate threat of an Iranian bomb — and that U.S. intelligence never believed Iran was close to producing one — it’s hard to argue this goal was achieved.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., June 26, 2025. (Kashif Basharat/Department of Defense Photo)

The ‘bitter taste’ of war

Another question mark hangs over the war’s impact on Israel’s deterrence in the Middle East. On one hand, Israel’s military clearly demonstrated overwhelming superiority: it flew over Iranian airspace unimpeded, possessed precise intelligence on the whereabouts of senior Iranian defense officials and nuclear scientists, and carried out targeted strikes with remarkable accuracy. Its operational and technological capabilities were on full display.

Israel also proved that it can act as the region’s neighborhood bully — disregarding international law, bypassing ongoing negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration — while continuing to enjoy unwavering support from the West, especially from Washington.

But while Netanyahu’s success in drawing the United States into a war he initiated undoubtedly bolstered Israel’s image as a regional power, it would be a mistake to overlook the degree of deterrence Iran managed to establish.

Since 1948, Israel’s major cities have never faced the kind of sustained threat experienced during this war: multiple buildings reduced to rubble; 25 more slated for demolition due to structural damage; 29 Israeli civilians killed; nearly 10,000 people left homeless; over 40,000 compensation claims filed with the property tax authority; city streets emptied; and economic activity grinding to a halt. October 7 was horrifying, but it was largely perceived by Israelis as a singular catastrophe. The 12-day war with Iran, however, chipped away at their long-held sense of security. Millions felt that immunity begin to crack.

Iran demonstrated that despite Israel’s cutting-edge defenses, its home front is still vulnerable. Images of destruction from Tel Aviv, Bat Yam, and Be’er Sheva resembled scenes from Gaza — and they were widely circulated across the region, even by those who don’t necessarily support the Iranian regime. Even if most Israelis feel the suffering was “worth the price” of dealing a major blow to Iran, the constant scramble to shelters, sleepless nights, and daily disorientation left a lasting psychological toll. Should conflict reignite, Israelis are unlikely to approach it with the same composure.

Home Front Command forces at the scene where a ballistic missile fired from Iran hit and caused damage in Bat Yam, central Israel, June 15, 2025. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

It’s clear Netanyahu and the Israeli leadership were not seeking a drawn-out confrontation with Iran — precisely because it would undercut the narrative of “total victory” that dominated the early days of the campaign. That likely explains why, immediately after the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, most Israeli commentators and analysts began speaking of “wrapping up the story” within days.

Yet even in this limited 12-day confrontation, Israel did not accomplish its stated goals. At a press conference shortly after the offensive began, Netanyahu set out three objectives: dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, eliminate its ballistic missile capabilities, and sever its support for the “axis of terror.” Defense Minister Israel Katz went even further, stating one of Israel’s goals was to assassinate Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — effectively, to trigger regime change.

That “endgame” goal wasn’t achieved. In fact, while the details of the Trump-Tehran ceasefire agreement remain murky, what’s clear is that none of Netanyahu’s three aims have been fulfilled. Iran is in no rush to return to nuclear talks, accusing Washington of duplicity by engaging in diplomacy while greenlighting Israeli strikes. No restrictions have been made on Iran’s expanding missile arsenal, which Israeli army Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir cited as the main reason for the “preemptive strike.” And there’s no reduction in Iranian support for its so-called “ring of fire” — the regional network of proxies encircling Israel.

If Israel has emerged as the superior military power, diplomatically, it appears to have gained little, if anything at all. That outcome shouldn’t be surprising: since the war in Gaza began, Netanyahu has largely abandoned efforts to set clear diplomatic goals for military action, relying instead on force as the sole instrument of policy, from Gaza and Lebanon to Syria and now Iran.

This latest front has once again exposed the limits of that approach. From day one, Iran declared it would not negotiate under fire, demanding a ceasefire before any return to nuclear talks. Israel refused, and Netanyahu seemed to apply the same strategy that was previously reserved for Hamas: negotiations only under fire. Yet in the end, the ceasefire was declared without any (known) preconditions, exactly as Iran had demanded.

The gap between ambitious “objectives” and more elusive “achievements” is already sowing disappointment, at least on the Israeli right. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich described a “bitter taste” alongside the “decisive victory.” Benny Sabti, an Iranian-born Israeli analyst who has become a prominent voice on Israeli news panels during the war, tweeted that “a ceasefire amid ongoing rocket fire and fatalities is an irrational decision. Iran will emerge stronger.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gives a press conference with Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich at the Prime Minister’s office in Jerusalem, January 11, 2023. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90)

Even Netanyahu’s apparent diplomatic coup in drawing the U.S. military into an Israeli-initiated war is now being reassessed. Just days ago, it was hailed as a personal triumph for the Israeli premier, with lawmaker Aryeh Deri calling Trump “God’s messenger for the Jewish people.” But by relying on the United States to deliver the final blow at Fordow, Israel effectively ceded a degree of control, culminating in a clear reminder that Trump still had the last word. After Iran launched a missile three hours after the ceasefire, Israel sent warplanes to retaliate. But as they were already en route, Trump publicly warned Israel on his Truth Social account, “DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS,” forcing the planes to turn back.

A political restoration?

On the surface, Netanyahu appears to be the big winner of this war in Israel. Even his fiercest critics in the media have given him credit for the military success, to say nothing of his supporters, who have returned to speaking about him in near-divine terms. He himself seems reborn: giving interviews, visiting missile impact sites, eating falafel with the people — gestures he had all but abandoned since the launch of his judicial overhaul, and certainly since October 7. Unsurprisingly, speculation is already swirling in the media that he might call early elections to capitalize on his newfound glory.

But the polls published since Israel’s opening strike against Iran have been less encouraging for Netanyahu than one might expect. Likud has gained some ground, but the right-wing coalition bloc remains stuck at a projected 50 Knesset seats — not enough to prevent the opposition from forming a government. One possible explanation is that air force pilots and intelligence officers, the two groups perhaps most associated with the anti-Netanyahu protest movement, have emerged as the war’s true heroes.

The main reason Netanyahu chose this moment to launch a war with Iran was to make Gaza fade from view: to make people forget his failure to eliminate Hamas; to forget the hostages that are still in captivity; to forget the mounting international outrage over the horrific images emanating from the Strip; to forget the growing domestic frustration with the war; and to forget that the monstrous plan to push Palestinians into southern Gaza in preparation for expulsion has stalled, accomplishing little beyond shooting at starving civilians waiting in line for food.

But now that the war with Iran is over, Gaza is once again impossible to ignore. Any Israeli who needed a reminder didn’t have to wait long: on June 25, seven soldiers were killed by an IED in Khan Yunis. And contrary to Netanyahu’s hopes, the pressure to end the war in Gaza is only likely to intensify.

Protesters march through the streets of Haifa calling for an end to Israel’s war on Gaza, May 31, 2025. (Yahel Gazit)

Even before the deadly incident in Khan Yunis, there was already a palpable sense of fatigue and despair among Israeli troops serving in Gaza, particularly reservists. The war with Iran may in fact reinforce a growing belief among Israelis that if the country can successfully confront a supposedly existential threat like Iran’s nuclear program, then it can certainly manage a far lesser challenge like Hamas, striking a deal to end the war in exchange for all the hostages. Indeed, the “Hostage and Missing Families Forum,” the main group representing the families of Israelis still held captive in Gaza, wasted no time in making the connection. “Anyone who can bring about a ceasefire with Iran can also end the war in Gaza,” it declared in a statement following the ceasefire.

It remains unclear whether Trump will now push to end the war in Gaza in order to bolster his image as a peacemaker. But if he does head in that direction, it will be far harder for Netanyahu to resist, especially after effectively handing Trump the keys to ending the war with Iran.

MAGA figurehead Steve Bannon’s furious outburst, calling Netanyahu a “brazen liar” for violating the Trump-brokered ceasefire, is an early warning sign. And European countries, many of which backed Israel during the Iran war out of an instinctive West-versus-East reflex, may now escalate their threats to sanction Israel unless it “ends the suffering” in Gaza, and perhaps even follow through on them.

For over 30 years, the “existential threat” from Iran — and the claim that only he could neutralize it — has been one of Netanyahu’s most powerful political cards. But now he’s played it. And it won’t be easy to play again. He cannot credibly claim in the near future that Iran is on the verge of building a bomb without undermining the very “decisive victory” he celebrated on live television.

That leaves the ethnic cleansing in Gaza and the annexation of the West Bank as Netanyahu’s remaining agenda. But politically, those are far weaker cards, especially if they stand alone without the looming specter of an Iranian “axis of evil.”

Without a strong card left to play, Netanyahu may come to see a comprehensive deal on Gaza — as recently floated by Gilad Erdan, former ambassador to Washington and longtime Netanyahu loyalist — as the most viable path forward: End the war, bring the hostages home (the few that are still alive), and go to elections riding the fumes of victory in Iran and pictures embracing the returning captives.

Smotrich and Ben Gvir would likely bolt from the coalition. But if Netanyahu were to win the election, they would almost certainly return, for the sake of pushing through the judicial overhaul and West Bank annexation. It would be a dramatic gamble, and a reversal of nearly everything Netanyahu has done over the past 20 months. But paradoxically, the odds of such a pivot may have increased after the murky conclusion of the Iran war.

A version of this article was first published in Hebrew on Local Call. Read it here.

Meron Rapoport is an editor at Local Call.

Tags: Iran Benjamin Netanyahu Six Day War Donald Trump Local Call

This article was downloaded from https://www.972mag.com/israel-iran-netanyahu-victory-disillusionment/ at 28 June 2025, 7:20 PM EDT.

AHMED AHMED || JUN 26, 2025, 4:06 PM EDT || SOURCE

Skating through rubble: The volunteers reclaiming joy for Gaza’s children

Through skateboarding, circus, and art therapy, young Gazans bring healing and brief moments of normalcy to children living through genocide.

Rajab Al-Rifi and his team training children at Gaza Port in western Gaza City, May 20, 2025. (Ahmed Ahmed)

Rajab Al-Rifi stands in the shattered remains of Gaza City’s YMCA building, a skateboard under his arm, teaching a group of children how to keep their balance on streets cracked and cratered by bombs.

The 28-year-old photographer and professional skateboarder has trained young Gazans since 2008. Before the war, he led the enclave’s only skateboarding team, “SkatePal,” coaching kids aged 6 to 16 on a small ramp by the beach in western Gaza City — until Israeli warships reduced it to rubble.

His home in the neighborhood of Shuja’iyya was hit by an Israeli airstrike in November 2023, forcing him into repeated displacement across northern Gaza. Each time, he salvaged what little he could, often hauling his belongings on his skateboard.

With frequent power outages and telecommunications breakdowns, he lost contact with many of his former teammates. But in early 2024, Al-Rifi started posting more and more videos to the team’s social media, hoping to inspire resilience among young Gazans and send a message of defiance to the world.

“One of the biggest challenges is the lack of safe places to skate,” he told +972 Magazine. “Most streets are destroyed, so I’ve been skating on the slanted rooftops of bombed buildings.”

Slowly, some of his 100 teammates found their way back. Together, they organized pop-up shows and workshops for displaced children in makeshift shelters across the north.

Gaza Skate Team members training children at Gaza Port in western Gaza City, May 20, 2025. (Ahmed Ahmed)

For Al-Rifi, skateboarding was a way to offer children a brief moment of relief from relentless trauma. “Whenever the kids see us, they come running,” he said. “They’re desperate for even a brief escape from the fear.”

He now holds weekly training sessions for boys and girls, spending the rest of his time performing in shelters, schools, and on the streets. Over 250 young Palestinians are eager to join the team, but Al-Rifi has only six skateboards left. Most of the equipment, including protective gear, shoes, and clothing, was destroyed in airstrikes.

“Some kids play barefoot,” he said. “I warn them to be careful. If they get injured, there’s no medicine or proper nutrition in Gaza to help them heal.”

Training on an empty stomach has become the norm. “Sometimes I feel dizzy myself,” he admitted. “But I try not to waste their energy. They need it to fetch water or firewood.”

The team relies on community donations and whatever local support they can find. When possible, Al-Rifi shares small snacks with the children, many of whom are malnourished. Since Israel imposed a total blockade in March that lasted nearly three months, Gaza’s hunger crisis has spiraled, with over 70,000 children now suffering from severe malnutrition, according to recent reports.

View this post on Instagram

A post shared by Team_Skate_Gaza (@gaza_skate_team)

“I love every moment we spend playing with Captain Rajab,” said 9-year-old Ahmed Almasri, who was displaced from northern Gaza and now shelters in central Gaza City. “He teaches us how to do tricks. I wish I had my own skateboard so I could skate all the time.”

But as the bombardment intensified and Israeli evacuation orders swept through the north, their regular skate spot at the YMCA became too crowded. “The place was filled with tents,” Al-Rifi said. “The children cried, asking where they could skate now. We tried to move to Gaza’s port, but that too was full of evacuees.”

Al-Rifi has lost two of his closest friends — Ahmed Al-Shawa and Dorgham Qreaiqea — both of whom worked in entertainment and mental health before being killed in Israeli airstrikes. Yet despite the constant threat of bombing and immense personal loss, he continues skating.

“We’ve lost everything,” he said. “But we won’t lose hope for a better future for our children.”

Rajab Al-Rifi and his team training children at Gaza Port in western Gaza City, May 20, 2025. (Ahmed Ahmed)

A glimpse of a normal life

Like Al-Rifi, 34-year-old Mohammed Obeid uses creativity to shield Palestinian children from trauma amid the unfolding genocide.

A therapeutic educator, Obeid co-founded the group “Free Gaza Circus” in 2011 alongside 12 other young Gazans, with Italian and Spanish partners. Before the war, their programs blended music, dance, and theater to help children process trauma and pursue their talents. Now, they organize dabke performances, circus shows, and therapeutic workshops for displaced kids across the enclave.

Recently, Obeid and his team revived the “Clown Doctor” project, visiting hospitals in white coats and circus makeup to entertain injured and traumatized children. “We try to ease their fear of doctors and white coats and help them respond better to treatment,” said Obeid.

“Kids in Gaza need creative outlets to release the emotions they’ve been bottling up,” he added. “We invent group games and other playful activities to help them release their energy in different ways.”

Although it is independent, Free Gaza Circus occasionally partners with other circus schools, like the Palestine Circus School, while NGOs like the Italian Cooperazione Internazionale Sud Sud (CISS) provide the team with gear and transportation support. The group prioritizes remote areas where aid is scarce, but closures and constant evacuation orders often force them to abandon equipment or improvise with what is available.

“Sometimes, we have to get creative,” Obeid explained. “We’ve used vegetables instead of circus props and eggplants as juggling clubs.”

View this post on Instagram

A post shared by Save Youth Future Society (@syfspal)

Obeid and his team have extensive experience working with traumatized children and have received training in Psychological First Aid (PFA). Mental health professionals and aid organizations often contact them to identify children in need of tailored visits or special care.

“We can’t erase their fear and suffering,” Obeid admitted, “but we try our best to give them at least two hours of joy and laughter. A glimpse of a normal life.”

In addition to regular meetings to refine their approach, the team often travels to high-risk areas, sometimes even amid ongoing Israeli attacks.

“During loud bombings and explosions, we try to keep the children focused by singing louder and playing music,” Obeid said. “We know that schools and shelters are being bombed, but we carry on because we believe in our role: helping children survive the trauma of war.”

‘We try to make them laugh, but we also need support’

Ruba Al-Najjar, 21, spins 8-year-old Layan in a joyful dance, their laughter and the music masking the hum of Israeli drones flying overhead. Layan, who has Down syndrome, grins brightly. “I am happy,” she says. “I want to play all the time.”

Al-Najjar was first displaced to a school in northern Gaza’s Sheikh Zayed neighborhood after her home was bombed in early 2024. Later forced to flee again, she now shelters with relatives in a tent in western Gaza City.

Ruba Al-Najjar paints kids’ faces at Hassan Salama School, in western Gaza City, May 8, 2025. (Ahmed Ahmed)

“I was buried under the rubble when our house was hit,” she recalled. “After surviving, I felt a responsibility to leave a mark, even if only for a few hours, on the lives of children who are going through this nightmare.”

The idea of forming a support team had long been in Al-Najjar’s mind, but the war pushed her to act. Alongside friends and relatives, mostly university students from diverse fields with volunteer experience, she assembled a team of 18 dedicated to helping Gaza’s children.

They organize art therapy sessions in shelters and schools, lead dabke dances and face-painting activities, and provide psychological support to children and parents, including basic emergency first-aid training. The team does all this without any external financial support; sometimes they borrow equipment from other circus schools or friends in Gaza.

Al-Najjar and her team carefully monitor the security situation, timing their activities during lulls in bombings or in areas with fewer drones, seeking fleeting moments of safety. “My mother begs me not to go out,” she said. “But my father says, ‘Go — just be careful.’

“We know we could be killed at any moment,” she continued. “But my team and I believe it’s our duty to give these children a reason to hold on. We try to make them laugh, even though we, too, desperately need support.

“We’ve begged the world enough,” Al-Najjar added. “We are exhausted. We can’t carry any more pain, not for ourselves, and not for the children.”

Ahmed Ahmed is a pseudonym for a journalist from Gaza City who asked to remain anonymous for fear of reprisal.

Tags: Gaza October 7 war Genocide Palestinian culture art

This article was downloaded from https://www.972mag.com/gaza-children-skateboarding-art-circus/ at 28 June 2025, 7:20 PM EDT.

MIRA AL HUSSEIN || JUN 25, 2025, 4:57 PM EDT || SOURCE

What the UAE hopes to gain from Israel’s growing isolation

Abu Dhabi seeks to present itself to the West as a stable alternative to an increasingly rogue Israel, where defense cooperation and capital can flourish.

President Donald Trump participates in a bilateral meeting with UAE President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at Qasr Al Watan in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, May 15, 2025. (Daniel Torok/Official White House Photo)

When U.S. President Donald Trump visited the Gulf last month, complete with fanfare and choreographed spectacle, it reinforced a growing sense among Gulf states that the region is on a political ascent. The four-day tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates was Trump’s first major foreign trip in his second term — a deliberate decision to bypass traditional U.S. allies, including Israel — and Gulf officials and academics increasingly view themselves as part of a rising bloc with significant leverage.

The assumption, evident in the Abraham Accords, that access to the United States was best secured via Israel seemed to be giving way to a new confidence that the Gulf can deal directly with Washington, and be heard on its own terms. As former Emirati Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash recently put it, the balance of power is seen to be tilting in the Gulf’s favor.

Whether these assumptions reflect reality or are grounded in any tangible and lasting shifts in the international order remains to be seen. Indeed, Trump’s decision to join Israel in attacking Iran — and Iran’s retaliatory strikes against the Al Udeid U.S. military base in Qatar — sounded alarm bells in Gulf capitals, and leaders are now trying to ensure that the fragile ceasefire holds.

The Iran-Israel crisis has presented deep and potentially existential risks for Gulf states. But it has also offered critical opportunities to try to increase their leverage with Washington, position themselves as regional intermediaries, and to be seen — in stark contrast to Israel — as the responsible adults in the room. “It’s still the Gulf’s moment,” one prominent Emirati professor argued after the ceasefire was reached, “and it’s here for years to come.”

Nowhere is this desire more evident than in the UAE, which has long asserted itself as a step ahead of its neighbors. The UAE is often referred to as “Little Sparta,” a moniker that once captured its military buildup, regional interventions, and strategic ambitions. It was a label that spoke to the country’s growing martial prowess and readiness to project force, including in support of U.S. interests. But if the UAE was once content to be seen through that lens, it no longer wants to be confined by it.

Today, Abu Dhabi envisions a far more sophisticated role for itself — one that is not dictated by external perceptions or interests, but by its own strategic calculus to pursue an independent agenda that reflects its security priorities and global ambitions for influence. In this new paradigm, the UAE frames itself as a rational, dependable alternative to Israel: a state it can partner with, learn from, and perhaps even siphon talent and expertise from to help build its own seat of empire at home.

President Donald Trump participates in an arrival ceremony at Qasr Al Watan in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, May 15, 2025. (Daniel Torok/Official White House Photo)

In a series of posts on X/Twitter, Emirati analyst Mohammed Baharoon recently warned that Israel risks becoming the region’s principal source of instability, likening its posture to that of the mythical character Thor, whose worth comes only from his hammer. The region, he argued, has no appetite for godlike actors wielding blunt force, but needs reliable actors who are capable of building economic partnerships and prioritizing them over security alliances. Implicit in these posts is the UAE’s quiet self-promotion as the rational, steady alternative to Israel — for both regional and international actors alike.

A new regional linchpin

For the UAE, the Gaza war and Israel’s growing global isolation has presented a strategic opportunity to strengthen this image. But the groundwork for this opportunity was laid much earlier, during the 2021 crisis in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah, where Israel’s attempts to displace Palestinian residents sparked international outcry.

The surge of global criticism of Israel’s actions — which came on the heels of a landmark Human Rights Watch report accusing Israel of apartheid — coupled with a newfound willingness by Western media to platform Palestinian voices that challenge the Israeli narrative, signalled a potential shift that could quickly gather momentum. The backlash to Israel was not confined to the Arab world, but resonated globally — prompting the UAE to ease its heavy-handed restrictions on public criticism of Israel, which was untenable in the immediate aftermath of normalization.

Attuned to these shifting currents both domestically and internationally, the UAE began to envision a new role for itself as a regional linchpin.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, U.S. President Donald Trump, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani attend the Abraham Accords signing ceremony at the White House, September 15, 2020. (Avi Ohayon/GPO)

Politically stable, economically prosperous, and projecting an image of social tolerance, the UAE has carefully cultivated its profile as an emerging middle power — one that, unlike Israel, is self-sufficient and independent of foreign aid. The UAE sees itself as a successful model of non-democratic coexistence, unburdened by perpetual internal conflicts and largely impervious to hostilities from neighboring states. And having spent decades systematically suppressing Islamist activism both at home and abroad, the UAE can position itself as a dependable Western ally, a model of “secular autocracy.”

While the UAE continues to act as a bulwark against Islamism, it has been largely comfortable engaging with religious fundamentalism elsewhere, whether by deepening ties with Israel’s current right-wing government, warming relations with India’s Hindu nationalist leadership, or coddling U.S. evangelical networks. To Abu Dhabi, such fundamentalisms can be rationalized, tolerated, or even partnered with because they pose no real threat to its domestic legitimacy or regional ambitions.

In particular, the UAE sees India’s rise, with its distinct civilizational identity, as evidence that religious nationalism can coexist with international respectability. The common denominator, however, is hard power — nuclear capability, economic heft, and strategic indispensability — a currency that the UAE seeks to acquire. But unlike India, the UAE has been actively cultivating a national identity that showcases a cultural heritage deliberately untethered from religion, in part to dispel the persistent refrain that it and its Gulf neighbors lack historical depth, authentic culture, or civilizational roots.

One telling example unfolded during President Trump’s visit to the UAE, when he and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) walked between two opposing rows of sword-wielding, male Ayyala dancers, flanked by troupes of young female dancers known as Na’ashaat. While the spectacle drew a flurry of puzzled comments internationally, the choreography was calculated: the UAE was not only asserting its cultural heritage, but by foregrounding female performers in a highly public setting, it also conveyed an image of liberalism to international audiences.

Embedded in this display was a deeper layer of defiance. During the bitter rift between Qatar and the UAE from 2017 to 2021, when diplomatic spats descended into vulgar insults aimed at the mothers of each emirate’s ruling heads, Abu Dhabi’s ruling family became the target of a particularly pointed epithet: “the children of the Na’asha.” Intended as an insult to MBZ’s mother, Sheikha Fatima, who is said to have once been a young Na’asha before catching the eye of Sheikh Zayed, the phrase still lingers on Gulf social media.

Against this backdrop, the public display of the Na’ashaat during a high-profile state ceremony was not merely cultural pageantry but an act of reclamation, transforming a weaponized reference into an assertion of national pride.

President Donald Trump meets with UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, in the Presidential Flight Terminal at Abu Dhabi International Airport in the United Arab Emirates, May 15, 2025. (Daniel Torok/Official White House Photo)

Filling a geopolitical vacuum

Beyond the cultural rebranding, the UAE has been equally adept at showcasing its wealth, stability, and global connectivity. From government officials’ frequent announcements of new partnerships with Silicon Valley executives, to the steady drumbeat of headlines in local and international media hailing the UAE as a magnet for global capital and elite migration, the message is clear: in a volatile Middle East, the UAE wants to be seen as a sanctuary of stability.

With Israel mired in a prolonged war in Gaza and an expanding war in Iran, in addition to diplomatic crises and mounting economic strain, the UAE sees a strategic opening. Abu Dhabi is in place to absorb the anticipated exodus of capital and talent as investors and businesses seek out more stable ground.

The UAE is also strengthening its footprint in sectors traditionally dominated by Israel, including technology, defense, and diplomacy. A case in point is Abu Dhabi’s announcement during Trump’s visit of plans to build the largest cluster of artificial intelligence data centers outside the United States, cementing its position as a regional tech hub.

But the UAE isn’t just competing in tech. The disruption of maritime traffic in the Red Sea by the Houthis also afforded it an opportunity to assert itself as a vital node in an emerging, albeit aspirational, regional logistics network. In response to the attacks on shipping, Abu Dhabi launched an initiative to establish a land bridge designed to circumvent Houthi interference and facilitate the overland transportation of goods to Israel via the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Framed as a strategic contingency, this project also serves as a prototype for a broader, long-term ambition: the development of a trans-regional trade corridor connecting India to Europe through the Middle East, with the UAE poised to occupy a central role. Advancing this vision, Abu Dhabi recently signed an $800 million Memorandum of Understanding to develop Syria’s port of Tartous. It’s the kind of deal that Israel itself, given its belligerence toward Syria and much of the region, could likely never have secured.

But the UAE’s Spartan ambitions are informed by Israel’s extensive and multifaceted military footprint, both within and outside of the region. The ongoing genocide in Gaza has created a useful distraction, enabling the UAE to deepen its military engagements and interventions, particularly in Africa, with Sudan becoming a key theatre of military power and influence.

By leveraging the diplomatic capital afforded by the Abraham Accords, the UAE has been able to preempt criticism and deflect scrutiny over its military involvement in Sudan and other conflicts in Africa. In doing so, it perceives itself as occupying a position of relative impunity, akin to that historically enjoyed by Israel due to its alignment with Western security interests. Unlike Israel, however, the UAE has thus far managed to evade comparable international censure, maintaining an image of pragmatism and stability, despite its own sub-imperialist interventions in conflicts such as those in Sudan, Yemen, and Libya.

A case in point is the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) recent dismissal of Sudan’s case accusing the UAE of complicity in genocide for its role in arming and funding paramilitary forces, citing a lack of jurisdiction. The UAE celebrated the decision as a significant victory and a testament to its soft power, rather than a dismissal based on a technicality. And while Israel faces persistent accusations of testing weapons and intrusive surveillance technologies on Palestinians under occupation, Abu Dhabi instead markets its permissive regulatory environment as a sandbox for technological innovation, where CEOs can trial cutting-edge products with minimal oversight.

In this context, the UAE appears to be cultivating a role as an alternative to Israel: a rational, dependable regional ally for Western powers that will not jeopardize the legitimacy of the global order or inadvertently empower adversaries such as Russia and China, who are keen to exploit Israel’s erosion of international legal norms and the visible paralysis of multilateral institutions for their own purposes. By avoiding the overt diplomatic embarrassments and legal repercussions currently afflicting Israel, the UAE is preparing to fill a geopolitical vacuum should the contradictions of the Israeli project render it unsustainable in the long term.

Mira Al Hussein is a sociologist of the Arab states of the Gulf and a Research Fellow at the Alwaleed Centre, University of Edinburgh.

Tags: Gulf States Abraham Accords United States Donald Trump

This article was downloaded from https://www.972mag.com/uae-israel-isolation-regional-stability/ at 28 June 2025, 7:20 PM EDT.

OREN ZIV || JUN 24, 2025, 5:08 PM EDT || SOURCE

12 days that brought the war home to Israelis

Iran’s missiles caused many Israelis to feel existential fear for the first time. Even if the ceasefire holds, their shattered sense of immunity will linger.

Israeli rescue crews clear the debris and search for the missing in the southern Israeli city of Be'er Sheva after an Iranian missile strike hit a seven-story building, claiming the lives of at least four people, June 24, 2025. (Oren Ziv)

In partnership with

Over the past 12 days, I have documented the daily scenes of Iranian missile strikes in Israel, which have occurred mostly at night. To some I arrived just minutes after impact, while the fires were still burning and the wounded were being pulled from the rubble.

Arriving in the dark is always deceptive — you don’t see much besides the ambulances and fire trucks. Gradually, with the first light of day, the true scale of the disaster site is revealed: how many homes, vehicles, and windows were damaged, over what radius, and whether people are still buried under the rubble. Hours after the impact, residents return to try to salvage some of their belongings while neighbors and curious onlookers arrive to inspect the damage.

At the deadly scene in Bat Yam where nine people were killed, rescue teams worked for days to clear the debris and retrieve all the bodies. The collapsed buildings, gaping crater, ash-covered trees and cars, and people fleeing in pajamas with their children and belongings in their arms eerily resemble the images Israelis have seen coming out of Gaza over the past two years — even despite the media’s self-censorship.

Unlike the scenes of past shooting attacks or rocket strikes across Israel, where the slogan “Death to Arabs” is often ubiquitous, I haven’t encountered any calls for revenge or chants of “Death to Iranians.” Perhaps it’s the shock, perhaps it’s Israel’s role as initiator of the war, or perhaps it’s a deeper reckoning with the limits of Israeli power. This is, after all, Israel’s first war against a sovereign state since 1973, and the first it initiated against a state since 1967.

A fragile ceasefire has taken hold since the morning of June 24 — though not before an Iranian missile struck a residential building in the southern Israeli city of Be’er Sheva, killing four people. Whether or not the ceasefire holds, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can already take credit for one major achievement: shattering Israelis’ sense of immunity.

Rescue crews evacuate a woman from her home in North Tel Aviv after an Iranian missile hit her neighborhood, June 22, 2025. (Oren Ziv)

Indeed, this war — which has taken the lives of at least 28 people in Israel — has made tens if not hundreds of thousands of Israelis, especially in Tel Aviv and its surrounding suburbs, genuinely fearful for their lives. For some of them, it’s the very first time.

Fear has always accompanied life in Israel — whether from shootings and stabbings, intifadas, or “rounds” of fighting with Hamas and Hezbollah. But this time feels different. It’s not just existential anxiety; it’s an immediate, personal fear, especially in the country’s center. People feel death close by, in the sound of missiles exploding and the extent of the devastation that follows strikes that weren’t intercepted.

What could previously be repressed or managed through some semblance of routine now requires confronting head-on. The killing, destruction of homes, and halting of daily life all point to one conclusion: Israel’s policies are making the country unlivable for its own population.

Visceral fear

Beyond the physical damage, the psychological toll is also crushing. Over the past two years, Israelis have grown accustomed to sirens and bomb shelters. Yet when the Houthis fired missiles and drones at Israel and issued evacuation notices mimicking those of the Israeli army in Gaza, many Israelis mocked them. The rockets of Hamas and Hezbollah, meanwhile, have certainly caused damage in Israel’s south and north, respectively, but they are easier for the army’s missile defense systems to intercept.

Iran’s missiles are a different beast, and the sober public mood reflects this. The streets of central Tel Aviv have been virtually deserted, in scenes reminiscent of the COVID-19 era — only without the safety of being out in the open air. And while most Jewish-Israelis have bomb shelters in their apartment blocks or access to nearby public shelters (Palestinian citizens, meanwhile, have been left chronically unprotected), many have instead headed to underground parking lots, knowing that anything above ground could be obliterated by a direct hit.

Israelis erect tents in the parking lot of the Dizengoff Center shopping mall, June 23, 2025 (Oren Ziv)

By the middle of last week, the humid parking lot of the Dizengoff Center shopping mall was filling up with tents, mattresses, beach chairs, and electric fans. A similar scene took shape in the 16,000-capacity public shelter beneath the Central Bus Station in south Tel Aviv, which was unlocked for the first time since the Gulf War of 1990-91.

“I came here because the Iranian missiles are much bigger, louder, scarier, and more destructive than those of Hezbollah and the Houthis,” 30-year-old Mali, who was sheltering with her cat on level -4 of the Dizengoff Center, told +972 Magazine. “I decided it’s better to be safe and stay here.”

Pnina, 46, said she was sheltering in the Dizengoff Center parking lot because the shelter in her building isn’t safe. “Seeing the damage in other places pushed us to come here,” she explained. “Volunteers brought us tents. I go home to work and study during the day, but I sleep here every night.”

The visceral fear that Israelis are experiencing isn’t happening in a vacuum. In the wake of the Hamas-led attacks of October 7 — which terrorized thousands of residents of Israel’s south — Israel has pursued a policy of making life hell for anyone deemed an enemy: through the destruction of Gaza, ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, and airstrikes on Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and now Iran.

The “Gaza doctrine” has been copy-pasted to Iran, complete with bizarre statements from the IDF Spokesperson about “evacuating” entire neighborhoods in Tehran, along with justifications for bombing a TV station for “incitement to genocide” and a university for being “affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards.” And the collateral damage of this drive for “total victory” has been to make life for ordinary Israelis unbearable.

As in many past cases, those who see the situation most clearly are the ones who have lost everything — who can see the larger disaster through their own personal tragedy. Attorney Raja Khatib, who lost his wife, two daughters, and sister-in-law in a direct missile hit on his home in the northern city of Tamra, told +972 after their funeral: “We finish [fighting] in Gaza and then start in Lebanon; finish in Lebanon and start in Syria; finish in Syria and start in Iran; finish in Iran and start a third or fourth Lebanon War — we don’t even remember what these wars are for anymore.”

Palestinians mourn the deaths of four members of the Khatib family killed in an Iranian missile attack in the Arab city of Tamra, northern Israel, June 17, 2025. (Oren Ziv)

Only two days before the disaster, Khatib and his family had returned from a vacation in Italy. “I have a home there on Lake Garda,” he explained. “I see how people live — waking up in the morning with hope, with love for others, thinking how to live well, earn a decent living, plan their vacations. And here, what are we dealing with? Wars and victims. Take it from me: let there be no more victims. Stop this cursed war, by any other means — sit at the table, prevent more casualties.”

Freedoms restricted

After October 7, most of those who left Israel didn’t flee the Hamas attack itself, but the reality created by Israel’s response: a war of revenge, the abandonment of the hostages, and the collapse of the social contract between the government and its citizens. The Israeli government immediately launched an unprecedented crackdown on the freedom of expression of those opposing the war, especially targeting Palestinian citizens of Israel. Now, the entire public is experiencing some of that suppression.

The clearest manifestation of this is the ban on leaving the country by air and the extreme warnings about the danger of crossing by land into Jordan or Egypt, effectively turning Israel into a ghetto. Another manifestation has been the attack on press freedom in the form of official directives by the Israeli military censor not to publish the locations of missile strikes, leading to residents and relatives having to play guessing games amid a flood of rumors on social media.

At the same time, incitement against the media has intensified. Right wingers now chase and harass photographers and camera crews at the scene of missile strikes. At the impact site in Be’er Sheva on June 24, several residents gathered around a Channel 13 reporter, accusing him of working for Al Jazeera — a refrain that has become a common slur for any media outlet that isn’t the far-right Channel 14, particularly after Israel banned the Qatari network. “You serve the enemy,” a nearby business owner told me as I took photos.

Last Saturday night, police raided a Haifa hotel used by several television networks and confiscated the cameras of three Arab journalists working for foreign outlets. The officers checked their press credentials and summoned them for questioning. According to a witness, the journalists pointed out that Al Jazeera was still broadcasting live despite the seizure, but police responded, “Say that during the investigation.” The journalists’ equipment has not yet been returned.

A civilian security squad led by far-right rapper Yoav Eliassi, known by his stage name “The Shadow,” detained a group of foreign journalists at a missile impact site in Tel Aviv, June 22, 2025. (Oren Ziv)

A day earlier, the military censor issued familiar guidelines. But in its English version, the Government Press Office (GPO) added a controversial clause requiring foreign journalists to seek prior approval from the censor for what they publish — a demand that goes beyond the censor’s legal authority.

Communications Minister Shlomo Karhi defended the move, stating that national security outweighs press freedom. However, Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara reportedly objected and demanded explanations from the ministers involved. Officials have privately claimed no major policy change, but acknowledged inconsistent enforcement and advised journalists to seek prior approval as a precaution.

Regardless of legal debates, it’s clear that incitement on the ground is having an effect on freedom of the press. “People think we’re Al Jazeera,” said one Arab journalist (who requested anonymity for fear of reprisals) who broadcasts in Arabic for an international network. “They say, ‘We’ll behead you.’” He explained that he even considered wearing a sign reading “I’m not Al Jazeera” to avoid harassment.

“People feel they have a minister and the police behind them, and a weak state they must defend,” he continued. As a result, he added, journalists now try to keep their time reporting in the field as brief as possible.

After striking Iran, the Israeli government banned all protests, with police systematically crushing even the smallest demonstration over the past week and a half. The long-running demonstrations for a hostage deal have been entirely abandoned, with the ban serving to disappear the issue from public consciousness.

The Israeli police dispersed a small vigil in Tel Aviv against the war with Iran, detaining four activists before the protest even started, June, 16, 2025. (Oren Ziv)

Last Sunday, around 20 protesters gathered silently with anti-war signs in Tel Aviv’s Habima Square, spacing themselves far apart to avoid violating the ban on public gatherings. Within a minute, a police unit — equal in number to the protesters — arrived, tore up the signs and made violent arrests.

The next day in Haifa, police detained several protesters, claiming that their anti-war T-shirts were illegal. Later, police detained two people overnight including the anti-Netanyahu activist Amir Haskel, who stood on a sidewalk in Tel Aviv holding a sign that read, “53 hostages in Gaza — their time is running out.” The Human Rights Defenders Fund has provided legal support to 12 protesters who were arrested since Israel first struck Iran.

After 12 days in which many Israelis have feared for their lives, the population is exhausted. People are relieved that the ceasefire, should it hold, will allow them to return to their regular routine — and will mark the end of a war that many supported but also feared Netanyahu would drag out for months or longer, as in Gaza. Some with less faith in the ceasefire are not returning home just yet, preferring to stay outside of the country’s center or close to shelters.

Even as Netanyahu declares that Israel has “removed an existential threat” with its attacks in Iran, the “routine” that Israelis are returning to is still one of perpetual war, as their army continues to wreak catastrophe in Gaza. The end of Iran’s missiles may restore Israelis’ feeling of safety, but the sense of immunity they felt two weeks ago will take much longer to return.

A version of this article was first published in Hebrew on Local Call. Read it here.

Oren Ziv is a photojournalist, reporter for Local Call, and a founding member of the Activestills photography collective.

Tags: October 7 war Israeli society Iran bomb shelters Benjamin Netanyahu

This article was downloaded from https://www.972mag.com/iran-missiles-israelis-fear-immunity/ at 28 June 2025, 7:20 PM EDT.

ORLY NOY || JUN 20, 2025, 7:11 AM EDT || SOURCE

Why everything Israelis think they know about Iran is wrong

For historian Lior Sternfeld, Israel's regime change fantasies ignore realities inside Iran and risk repeating historic mistakes.

Israeli flag next to the flag of Pahlavi Iran, at a protest against the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini, in Tel Aviv, Israel, October 29, 2022. (Tomer Neuberg/Flash90)

In partnership with

When Israel launched its onslaught on Gaza following the October 7 attack, it presented the public with two main objectives: destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages. Over time, the inherent contradiction between these goals became increasingly obvious; the fire-and-brimstone assault on the Strip not only failed to advance the hostages’ release, but actually directly and indirectly led to the deaths of over 50 of them. Then new goals began to emerge — including the ethnic cleansing of Gaza’s 2 million residents and the renewed long-term military occupation of the enclave.

Now, as Israel’s new war against Iran closes in on its first week, a similar but accelerated process is occurring: after initially declaring that it aimed to thwart the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, Israel is already openly professing its ambition to topple the regime of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

On Sunday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggested in an interview with Fox News that such a scenario “could certainly be the result of the war, because the Iranian regime is very weak. But the decision to act, to rise up, at this time is the decision of the Iranian people.”

The fantasy that an Iranian opposition will seize this moment to overthrow the regime and free the country from the Ayatollahs’ grip is also gaining traction in Israeli public discourse, as can be heard in nearly every TV panel discussion. But for Professor Lior Sternfeld, who teaches the modern history of Iran at Penn State University, this is a complete delusion, resting on the distorted Israeli perception of the political relevance of the Iranian opposition in the diaspora.

“In Israel, the voices being amplified are those of Reza Pahlavi [the exiled Iranian crown prince] and his supporters — people with no real credibility or influence inside Iran,” he told +972 Magazine in an interview. “In the past 10 years, a lot of money has been invested in building up his image, and suddenly he’s gone from being seen as a sixty-something slacker to a crown prince with a whole kingdom behind him.

“This is a reality that exists only in ‘Tehrangeles’ [a nickname for parts of Los Angeles with a large Iranian exile community] and in the margins of the current U.S. administration,” Sternfeld added. “And it’s the only one Israelis are hearing.”

The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Members of the Iranian jewish community demonstrate in support of the uprising in Iran sparked by rising fuel costs, in Holon, Israel, November 20, 2019. (Flash90)

The crown prince’s April 2023 visit to Israel — as a guest of the Intelligence Ministry, no less — did not exactly paint him as an Iranian patriot.

Exactly. It was immediately clear to me that he was trying to gain the support of Israel and the United States, not of the Iranian people. In this context, it’s worth mentioning his wife’s recent nasty post [with graffiti in English reading: “Hit them, Israel. Iranians are behind you”].

I think the official Israeli narrative with regard to Iran was summed up by [right-wing Israeli academic] Mordechai Kedar, who asserted that Iran is a fragile coalition of tribes waiting to fall apart. But anyone with even a basic knowledge of Iranian history knows that this is nonsense. There are Kurdish and Baluchi underground movements, but do they represent a broader sentiment? Absolutely not.

This type of wishful thinking is dominant among the Iranian diaspora that is still haunted by the 1979 revolution. Just as the revolution supposedly came from outside in the form of Khomeini [returning from exile], now the counter-revolution is imagined to arrive from the outside in the form of Pahlavi.

Reza Pahlavi, founder and leader of the self-styled National Council of Iran, an exiled opposition group, and then-Israeli Intelligence Gila Gamliel, at an event in Ramat Gan, April 19, 2023. (Avshalom Sassoni/Flash90)

But while there are undoubtedly people in Iran who are happy to see the [Israeli] attacks, and regime officials being exposed, in reality, this position has no foothold in the population. Just look at Iranian opposition figures who were tortured by the regime, who sat in Evin prison, and are now speaking out, saying: “We are against this attack, our country is under assault.” These are people who hate the mullahs, but right now, the enemy is Israel.

Moreover, there is currently no organized opposition in Iran capable of taking on power centers in a way that wouldn’t lead to total chaos — something I believe Iranians wish to avoid at all costs. The regime has a solid support base far beyond its security apparatus.

The Israeli attack tapped into Iran’s deepest political traumas — namely, Western attempts to overthrow its regime. I’ve lost count of how many times I’ve seen the name Mossadegh [Iran’s prime minister overthrown in 1953 in a coup orchestrated by the UK and the United States] mentioned in Iranian media over the past few days.

There have also been constant references to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. People are saying, ‘We will not be Iraq!’ — a country that sank into civil war and ultimately gave rise to ISIS. For Iranians, there’s a kind of hierarchy of tragedies. Even if they think the Islamic Republic is bad, it’s still better than ISIS.

Israeli Home Front command forces at the scene where a ballistic missile fired from Iran hit and caused damage in Bat Yam, south of Tel Aviv, June 15, 2025. (Oren Ziv)

This brings to mind the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, which broke out right after the major political purges that followed the revolution, when all the pilots who had been imprisoned by the new regime were released and reported for duty to fight against Iraq. They fought for the country, not for the regime.

At the start of the Iran-Iraq War, one of the key factors that helped consolidate the Islamic Republic was that all the opposition organizations essentially dissolved themselves. That’s what allowed the Khomeinist faction to come out on top. But once the war began, the opposition, led by the Tudeh [the Iranian Communist Party], announced they were ceasing operations, because now the homeland had to be defended.

Back then, one of Saddam Hussein’s explicit goals was to overthrow the Iranian regime. He said so openly. And even then, they used the exact same language we’re hearing today from the Israeli leadership: “The Iranian regime is weak, it will collapse in two weeks.”

Still, Israel’s attack clearly cast the Iranian regime in a poor light. The fact that the Mossad was able to penetrate so deeply into Iran’s most sensitive sites, to establish a drone base inside the country, to assassinate scientists — alongside images of crowds fleeing Tehran like we haven’t seen since the Iran-Iraq War — doesn’t all of this suggest a deeper instability within the regime?

I don’t know how many people in Iran were genuinely shocked by that. For most, it just reinforced their existing criticisms of the regime; that the Mossad could penetrate the country in such a fashion is proof that there are corrupt collaborators within the regime. I’ve seen Iranians writing: “What nerve the regime has to allow Iran to reach a point where we are so vulnerable.”

Could this catastrophic failure lead to the regime’s fall? Maybe. The conditions are there, but it has to be organic, from within. The critical question is: What could replace it? And right now, that remains very unclear. At this moment, all energy is focused on resisting Israel’s attack.

In your analysis of Iran, your basic assumption has always been that it’s a rational regime. We also saw the recent statement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who said that Iran doesn’t want to escalate, and if Israel stops its attacks, Iran will, too. Would it be fair to say that right now, the regime’s need to rehabilitate its image — especially in the eyes of the Iranian public — might outweigh its desire to maintain a measured policy toward the world?

Last April, when Iran launched drone strikes on Israel, it acted with restraint. Yet almost nobody in the media pointed out that Iran went to considerable lengths to warn of the attack and coordinate its timing. When it interpreted the Israeli attack as targeting military and IRGC facilities, its response was similarly directed at Israeli military sites.

Israeli anti-missile system fires interception missiles as drones and missiles fired from Iran, over the West Bank city of Hebron, April 14, 2024. (Wisam Hashlamoun/Flash90)

But we’re not in that place anymore. This time, Iran’s sense of security, and its pride, has been shaken. Once Israel began striking deep inside Tehran, in residential areas, we started seeing Iran also targeting population centers.

Israel’s defense capabilities are still far superior, and Iran understands this. But Iran also has more patience, and it’s still signalling a willingness to de-escalate, which is more than can be said of Israel.

What we’re seeing now is an attempt by Tehran to send a message to the region: that it will no longer play the role of the side that absorbs blows without retaliation. Unlike after the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, or on its military bases in Isfahan, when there was no public demand to respond, this time, Iranians are actually demanding action. Their message to the regime is: “Show us you’re worth something. Defend the homeland.”

Will this carry a diplomatic price, for example with regard to the nuclear deal, which is so important to Iran?

The nuclear deal is very important to Iran, but right now Iran feels betrayed by the United States. It’s important to note that many members of Iran’s nuclear negotiation team have been assassinated [during Israel’s most recent attack]. This led to conspiracy theories accusing the United States of orchestrating a set-up.

Even before former President Rouhani was given approval by the Supreme Leader in 2013 to begin negotiations over a nuclear deal, Khamenei said that an agreement with the Americans would be worthless, because the West doesn’t know how to keep its word. In the end, he was proven right.

Ali Khamenei and head officials of the Government of Iran, Dec. 29, 2015 (Official website of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei/via Wikimedia)

Later, when President Raisi restarted negotiations in the summer of 2023 with the United States over unfreezing assets, prisoner swaps, and more, Khamenei said, “Go ahead — but you’ll see there’s no point in dealing with the West.” And again, he was proven right.

And this was also the case with the current president, Pezeshkian. He was again elected despite Khamenei and the establishment’s wishes, and Khamenei gave him approval to start negotiations — and once more, he ended up being right. So while the reality of 2023 is not the same as in 2025, somehow, Khamenei always ends up being correct.

So given all this, would Iran even be interested in returning to nuclear negotiations? In the long run, I think Pezeshkian and Araghchi will make an effort to resume talks. But for now, it’s doubtful the Iranian public would support such a move without serious confidence-building measures from the other side. And frankly, it’s unclear whether a Trump administration would even be capable of taking those steps.

We’re entering territory that I don’t feel so confident in. We may be dependent on the goodwill of [Russian President] Putin and [Chinese President] Xi in their role as mediators. And who knows where that could lead.

Do you believe there has been a fundamental shift in Iran’s position, from preferring to be a nuclear-threshold state to becoming a full nuclear power?

Intuitively, I would say yes. Iran has always claimed that its [nuclear project] is for defensive purposes. Now it’s gotten its proof that it needs that defense.

Iranian missiles on display in front of the National Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense in Tehran, May 31, 2024. (Creative Commons)

And here, again, I want to distinguish between Iran and the regime: the regime sees that the only way to ensure its survival is to become fully and openly nuclear. This is part of a discourse that’s been ongoing in Iran for 20 years, according to which if Saddam Hussein had had nuclear weapons, the United States wouldn’t have actually invaded Iraq in 2003. So in that sense, going nuclear is the way to guarantee the regime’s survival.

There’s a very narrow window of opportunity now to return to intensive negotiations toward a nuclear deal, contingent on confidence-building measures, in order to keep Iran as a nuclear-threshold state. But if Iran now decides to break out and go fully nuclear, who wouldn’t be able to understand the logic behind that decision? After all, it was attacked — in Tehran, in Isfahan, in Natanz — by an [alleged] nuclear power.

In September last year, you took part in a much-discussed meeting with President Pezeshkian. If you met him today, what would you say to him?

That’s an excellent question, and I don’t have an answer to it. I can say that today, as then, I’m convinced that a different Middle East is within reach. And I’m still convinced that there will not be, in the foreseeable future, a more suitable government to make that transition than Pezeshkian’s.

It’s important to note that there are elections coming up soon in Iran. When the Iranian public feels disappointed with reformist presidents, they tend to stay home. That’s how [hardline former President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad was elected; after eight years of [the reformist Mohammad] Khatami, all they ended up with was more sanctions. But when people have a genuine sense of hope that things can be different, the reformists win, because they try to offer some kind of outline for a better future, even if the conditions seem impossible.

The bottom line is that Israel needs to let go of the illusion that a better future in the Middle East is possible without a final agreement with the Palestinians. If that were to happen, I’m certain we’ll be able to visit Tehran in our lifetime.

A version of this article was first published in Hebrew on Local Call. Read it here.

Orly Noy is an editor at Local Call, a political activist, and a translator of Farsi poetry and prose. She is the chair of B’Tselem’s executive board and an activist with the Balad political party. Her writing deals with the lines that intersect and define her identity as Mizrahi, a female leftist, a woman, a temporary migrant living inside a perpetual immigrant, and the constant dialogue between them.

Tags: Iran Iranian nuclear deal Israeli war on Iran Ali Khamenei October 7 war

This article was downloaded from https://www.972mag.com/why-everything-israelis-think-they-know-about-iran-is-wrong/ at 28 June 2025, 7:20 PM EDT.

SHATHA YAISH || JUN 19, 2025, 3:46 PM EDT || SOURCE

With Iran war as pretext, Israel suffocates the West Bank

After striking Tehran, the army closed hundreds of gates to seal Palestinians inside towns and strand them on roads — proof of annexation in all but name.

Palestinians wait at closed Israeli gates at the entrance to Hebron, in the West Bank, June 14, 2025. (Mosab Shawer)

As Israelis awoke early last Friday morning to discover that their country had started a war with Iran, Palestinians in the West Bank found that the Israeli army had placed them under lockdown.

Closures and checkpoints have been the norm in the occupied territory for decades, becoming even more numerous and restrictive in the wake of October 7. But after striking Iran, the army reduced Palestinians’ movement to a near-total standstill — sealing off towns and cities with iron gates, closing checkpoints between the West Bank and Jerusalem, and shutting down the Allenby border crossing with Jordan.

Israel justified the lockdown by claiming it needed to divert troops to other fronts. Yet the remobilization of reservists — many of them settlers — has actually increased the number of soldiers in the territory. The UN now reports that many of the closures have been lifted, but with several checkpoints closed and new gates and roadblocks erected, Palestinian mobility remains highly curtailed.

In East Jerusalem, too, rights groups have reported an escalation in restrictions and repression against Palestinians, including a total ban on worship at Al-Aqsa Mosque.

“Since the launch of Israel’s military operation in Iran, the authorities have implemented sweeping, heavy-handed measures reminiscent of the aggressive policing that followed October 7,” the Israeli NGOs Ir Amim and Bimkom said in a statement earlier this week. “These actions have severely disrupted daily life, curtailed freedom of worship, and violated the fundamental rights of Palestinian residents in the city.”

The ease with which Israel was able to cut off virtually all movement in and out of Palestinian towns and cities, thanks to an apparatus of control that includes nearly 900 checkpoints and gates, highlights the extent of the occupation’s footprint in the West Bank — and points to Israel’s broader objective for the territory with the world’s attention focused elsewhere.

Palestinian cars lined up at a road closed by the Israeli army near Hebron, in the West Bank, June 13, 2025. (Wisam Hashlamoun/Flash90)

“Everything is an opportunity for Israel,” Honaida Ghanim, director of the Ramallah-based Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies (commonly known by the Arabic acronym “Madar”), told +972 Magazine. “This government will seize any moment to further advance its ideological agenda, especially in the West Bank.”

In fact, she argues, what we’re seeing now is further proof of annexation in all but name. “It’s already happening on the ground; all the infrastructure points to it,” Ghanim said. “The idea is to fragment the population, squeezing people into smaller pockets to make them easier to control.

“The only thing missing is the official declaration. And when that comes, it will merely formalize what’s already there.”

‘Every village has a gate — we’re stuck’

Ahmad Abu Kamleh and his colleague Naeem Al-Shobaki were on their way to deliver goods to a supermarket near Ni’lin, a village west of Ramallah, when the lockdown came into effect. Their minibus soon ran out of diesel while trying to bypass the new roadblocks, at which point they became stranded.

After two nights stuck outside Ni’lin, sleeping in their minibus, they decided to ditch the vehicle and try to make their way home to Burin, near Nablus, by other means. First they took a taxi some of the way, before hitching a ride in three different private cars, which took them through at least eight villages. Amid a maze of roadblocks and forced detours, what should have been a 40-minute drive turned into a six-hour ordeal.

“I feel dead inside; only my body is alive,” Abu Kamleh told +972 after his nightmare journey. “The roads were almost empty, but there were soldiers everywhere. You feel scared to move. It’s not safe.”

Palestinians cross under closed Israeli gates at the entrance to Hebron, in the West Bank, June 14, 2025. (Mosab Shawer)

Meanwhile in Sinjil, a village in the northern West Bank, residents found themselves virtually cut off from the nearby cities of Ramallah and Nablus.

Mahfouz Fawlha, a dentist from the village, has a clinic in Ramallah, which he is now struggling to reach. “The clinic is only 15 minutes away, but now the journey could take more than two hours,” he explained.

Since October 7, the Israeli army has started erecting a barbed-wire fence to sever Sinjil from the main road and the residents’ rural lands. “Every village now has a gate,” Fawlha said. “We’re stuck.”

In Ramallah, Shadi and Diala (who preferred not to give their family name) had planned to baptize their daughter this weekend. But road closures prevented the Maronite priest from reaching the city from Jerusalem, while many family members were also unable to attend. Instead, they proceeded with a Latin priest based in Ramallah, who was available at the last minute.

As the ceremony ended, the sound of missiles echoed nearby. “We decided to move forward despite everything,” Shadi said. “What can we do? We don’t know what’s going to happen.”

Erasing the Palestinian question

Despite the surrounding lockdown, life in Ramallah over the weekend carried on largely as normal: shops opened, traffic flowed, and cafés gradually filled up. Some people rushed to buy essentials, forming lines at gas stations, but the mood remained subdued.

Iron Dome interception missiles as seen from the West Bank, June 18, 2025. (Wisam Hashlamoun/Flash90)

The Palestinian Authority made no immediate comment on the Israel-Iran escalation, even as Arab governments issued condemnations. Later, it urged calm and affirmed that the stockpile of basic supplies would be enough to meet residents’ needs for at least six months.

Hours after Israel’s initial attack on Iran, the Palestinian Civil Defense issued a statement asking people not to go on rooftops to watch flying objects — an instruction many ignored as social media quickly filled with videos of smoke trails and explosions in the sky. It also reminded residents that shrapnel could cause serious or even fatal injuries hundreds of meters from the blast, and urged them not to approach or touch any debris.

By Monday, a Civil Defense spokesperson reported that at least 80 pieces of shrapnel from intercepted missiles had fallen on Palestinian communities across the West Bank. Shrapnel falling on the city of Al-Bireh, near Ramallah, on Sunday ignited a rooftop fire.

Whereas Israelis living in illegal settlements in the West Bank have access to bomb shelters, Palestinians are totally exposed to falling missile fragments.

It is a similar story in East Jerusalem where, due to planning and building restrictions, there are only 60 public shelters for almost 400,000 Palestinians. By comparison, West Jerusalem has hundreds of public shelters for its predominantly Jewish population, and reinforced safe rooms are also common inside apartments.

Without proper protection, families live in constant fear during times of heightened conflict, uncertain where to take shelter if attacks escalate. And while the new war with Iran has left Palestinians anxious about what’s to come, many in the West Bank feel like they’ve already been living in a constant state of war for two years — or much longer.

For Ghanim of Madar, what happens next in the West Bank depends partly on how Israel comes out of its offensive in Iran. “If it emerges stronger, it will be even more empowered to push ahead,” she explained.

“This isn’t about managing the conflict anymore; it’s about ending it — on Israel’s terms — by erasing the Palestinian question entirely.”

In response to this article, an Israeli army spokesperson stated: “Since the beginning of Operation ‘Rising Lions’ and in light of warnings about intentions by terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] to carry out attacks against Israeli civilians under the cover of the complex security situation, movement restrictions have been implemented there. These restrictions vary according to ongoing situational assessments. This is not a lockdown, but rather the deployment of checkpoints and monitoring of movement.”

Shatha Yaish is a journalist covering East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Tags: West Bank roadblocks checkpoints Annexation Israeli army Iran

This article was downloaded from https://www.972mag.com/west-bank-lockdown-israel-iran/ at 28 June 2025, 7:20 PM EDT.

AMOS BRISON || JUN 17, 2025, 5:31 PM EDT || SOURCE

Netanyahu’s Iran gambit aimed to realign the world behind Israel. It may backfire

For Iran expert Ori Goldberg, Israel overreached in starting a war with Tehran, and can only avoid getting bogged down by dragging the West into the conflict.

Israeli security and rescue forces at the scene of an Iranian ballistic missile strike in Tel Aviv, June 17, 2025. (Avshalom Sassoni/Flash90)

Five days after Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran, this volatile new war shows no signs of winding down. What began with a series of Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites, military leaders, and scientists has escalated into a tit-for-tat exchange, with civilians in Israel and Iran bearing the brunt of the damage.

While Israel has claimed initial tactical victories — establishing aerial dominance and carrying out coordinated operations inside Iranian territory — it now faces mounting retaliation. Iran’s nightly missile attacks have repeatedly overwhelmed Israel’s air defenses, including in major urban centers, killing at least 24 people. In Iran, health officials say Israel’s attacks have killed well over 200 people and wounded more than 1,000 others.

Despite the initial show of force, Israel’s strategy remains murky — besides seeking to pressure the United States to join the war. And with its economy teetering, over 100,000 citizens stranded abroad, and public fear growing under intense bombardment, the long-term viability of this new war effort is not yet clear. All the while, Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza continues unabated.

To help make sense of Israel’s motivations in opening up a new front and assess what the coming days and weeks might bring, +972 spoke with Ori Goldberg, a leading Israeli academic and political commentator who has spent years studying the Iranian regime.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Why do you think Israel decided to launch a full-scale war against Iran right now, considering it’s already in a multi-front, multi-year war with an overstretched reserve army?

Ori Goldberg. (Courtesy)

Netanyahu’s claim that the attack was about preventing an immediate threat to Israeli national security is not just facetious, it’s fictitious. I think it was really an attempt to realign the world behind Israel.

The reason Netanyahu felt he had to do that, even at the cost of starting a full-fledged war, was that Israel had exhausted pretty much all of its options in Gaza after a nearly two-year long genocidal campaign. From military action that has failed to return the hostages, to the new Gaza Humanitarian Foundation “aid centers” [that have so far failed to facilitate widespread ethnic cleansing] — nothing Israel was doing in Gaza seemed to catch on. So Netanyahu did what he has done throughout the past two years: open up another front.

Iran was much easier for him [than other fronts] because the idea that the Islamic Republic must be dealt with using military means is perhaps the broadest, most solid consensus in Israeli politics. I think Netanyahu wanted to make political gains and ensure his personal status and future — above all, postponing his trial — as well as try to drag the world into this conflict by forcing, at the very least, the United States to side with Israel.

By the way, an attack this elaborate, with so many people outside Iran and people operating inside Iran to deploy drones — this could not have been in response to an imminent threat; it has obviously been planned for years. So it was a question of timing, and timing is always political.

Having launched the attack, do you think Netanyahu is now aiming to force a new nuclear agreement on better terms, to bring about regime change, or something else?

It’s everything and nothing. I think the truth is Israel isn’t committed to any one of those goals. And it’s good to have multiple goals, because if you don’t succeed in one, you can always point at another and say, “This is what I was actually trying to do.”

Strategically, Israel’s only real MO — as always — appears to be targeted assassinations of senior IRGC leaders. The drone attacks and bombings haven’t neutralized Iran’s entire array of air defenses. Israel has now issued evacuation orders for neighborhoods in Tehran; it seems to think Tehran is Beirut or Gaza.

According to the national security strategy that Netanyahu seems to be promoting, success looks like Israel being able to do whatever it wants, whenever it wants, without paying a price. Iran posed the biggest challenge in that respect, so Netanyahu basically said to the rest of the world, “I’ll see you and raise you — I’ll start a war with Iran.” That’s why I think all of this is happening.

Meanwhile, Iran is making its own calculations. I think it understands that it’s better in the medium- and long-term to absorb Israel’s aggression, demonstrating that it has the resolve to withstand such pressure, than to go all out and enter a suicidal war that it can’t win.

Still, Iran is firing missiles that are getting through Israel’s air defenses and killing Israelis on a nightly basis. They are making the entire country sleepless. I haven’t slept in four nights, and I’m as afraid as I’ve been in a while.

People take shelter in an underground train station in Tel Aviv during ongoing missile attacks from Iran, June 17, 2025. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

How significant were the initial Israeli strikes on Iran targeting senior military leaders and scientists? And how significant have the subsequent attacks been now that Iran has its defenses up?

Israel’s strategy of targeted assassinations has never worked apart from in the very short term. My sense is that the Islamic Republic’s leadership is back on track. This is not Hezbollah, where if you kill Hassan Nasrallah then you’ve really decapitated the organization.

So while the attack was very elaborate and sophisticated with multiple fronts and multiple targets, which took Iran by surprise, Israel nevertheless overreached — exactly as it did in Gaza. And with every day that passes, Israel gets further bogged down.

While it’s true that Israel has established aerial dominance, Iran has yet to deploy the heaviest missiles in its arsenal. And it has shown that it is not averse to firing with intent to kill civilians, despite mostly aiming at military targets.

Given the unprecedented level of destruction, human casualties, and fear inside Israel right now, how sustainable do you gauge this situation to be? Especially given that much of the Israeli economy isn’t really functioning, and the airport remains closed.

So far, most of the casualties have been old people, refugees from Ukraine, and Palestinians — people who are very much at the periphery of Israeli society. So the real sense of impending death is still far away. But the images [of the destruction] really are unprecedented.

Fire rises from the Bazan power plant in the northern Israeli city of Haifa after an Iranian attack, June 15, 2025. (Mordekay Baliti/Flash90)

I don’t see Israeli public opinion shifting significantly. The entire country is thirsty for a win after failing so abysmally in Gaza. But I also see Israelis generally drifting away from politics, and moving into personal survival mode: they will line up and buy supplies, they will not go to work, they will care for their kids, and generally do what has to be done. But I don’t see them rushing to enlist for a ground war against Iran.

Do you see a ground war as realistic?

Israel is now at a stage where its strategy is based on constant escalation. It always has to turn the volume up. And the only way to turn the volume up now is to insert special operations troops into Iran, or perform a [full-scale] ground invasion.

I understand that Israel’s elite 98th division was taken out of Gaza and told to prepare for the expansion of war with Iran. But while that’s all great rhetoric, I don’t see it happening. I think a ground war is the most unrealistic option of all. Basically, Israel overreached, and it is now stuck.

How do you see the war with Iran affecting the ongoing war in Gaza and negotiations with Hamas?

There are reports that Iran has approached both Israel and the United States through third parties to initiate talks to end the war. If the Iranians are smart, they will demand that Trump force Israel to sign an agreement that will end the war in Gaza too. I think the end of the war in Gaza and the end of the war with Iran are intimately connected — not because the Iranians are great patrons of the Palestinians, but because of Israel.

The real test for the international community is reigning Israel in. Israel has gone completely rogue: it feels like it has absolutely nothing to lose, that it’s setting its own rules and does whatever it wants. So this is about the international community stepping in and saying, “If you keep doing this, you’re going to be the new South Africa, at the very least.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu poses for a picture with French President Emmanuel Macron at the Prime Minister’s Residence in Jerusalem, January 22, 2020. (Marc Israel Sellem/POOL)

However, I don’t know if the world is up to the task. [Western leaders] are still saying that Israel has the right to defend itself. [French President] Emmanuel Macron said it, [UK Prime Minister] Keir Starmer said it, and of course [Germany’s Chancellor] Friedrich Merz said it. But I think in this case, it’s less about rhetoric and more about action.

At this point Netanyahu both doesn’t care anymore, and is firmly convinced that Israeli security is dependent on this complete freedom of action to do whatever it wants without paying a price.

How do you see the war evolving over the coming days or weeks? What are the best- and worst-case scenarios?

I’m not sure what the English equivalent is to the Hebrew expression להשתין מהמקפצה [“pissing from the diving board,” meaning acting brazenly], but Israel really is doing just that. It’s doing whatever the hell it wants, with absolutely no regard for anybody else’s interests. And that includes the United States.

I don’t think this war will be over in days, but I think it’s sensible to assume that as we head into next week there will already be talks about ending it. I don’t think Israel will be allowed to enjoy total impunity for much longer. There are going to be calls to answer for at least some of what it has been doing.

Nobody’s bought the whole “preventive strike” narrative. So I think, at least to some extent, Israel is going to have to suffer the consequences of its actions.

That’s surprisingly optimistic.

I am an incurable optimist. Of course, I also live here, so if Israel suffers the consequences of its actions my life is not necessarily going to get better. So, you know, I’m optimistic and masochistic at the same time.

Amos Brison is an editor at +972, based in Berlin.

Tags: Israeli attack on Iran Iran nuclear program October 7 war Gaza Benjamin Netanyahu

This article was downloaded from https://www.972mag.com/iran-israel-war-ori-goldberg/ at 28 June 2025, 7:20 PM EDT.

BAKER ZOUBI || JUN 17, 2025, 11:11 AM EDT || SOURCE

Unprotected from Iranian missiles, Palestinians in Israel decry neglect

The tragic death of four members of one family in the Arab city of Tamra has highlighted the systemic discrimination in Israel’s civil defense infrastructure.

Israeli security and rescue forces at the scene of an Iranian ballistic missile strike in Tamra, northern Israel, June 15, 2025. (David Cohen/Flash90)

In partnership with

Late Saturday night, an Iranian missile loaded with explosives struck a large house in Tamra, a Palestinian city in northern Israel. Within seconds, the explosion reduced the modern home to a pile of rubble, killing four members of the Khatib family and wounding dozens of their neighbors.

Raja Khatib, an attorney who lost his wife, Manar; daughters Shada, a 20-year-old university student, and Hala, aged 13; and sister-in-law, also Manar, in the blast, told +972 that he was not at home when the missile hit and rushed back as soon as the sirens stopped.

“When I arrived, my youngest daughter, Razan, said that her mother and sisters were on the upper floor and hadn’t been able to reach her in the safe room [reinforced to serve as an at-home bomb shelter] in time, because the missile fell so quickly,” he recounted. “I tried to reach them, but I couldn’t: the house was destroyed, and I realized they couldn’t be saved.

“Just three days ago we came back from a vacation in Italy,” Khatib continued. “How I wish the flight had been delayed by a day and canceled. My wife was my whole world. She was a successful teacher, loved by her students. My brother’s wife was the same. Shada was an outstanding law student; she dreamed of becoming a lawyer like me and my brother, maybe even a judge. Hala didn’t even have time to dream — she was only 13. I wouldn’t wish this even on my worst enemy.”

The tragedy suffered by the Khatib family, who join some 20 other casualties of Iranian missiles in Israel since the Israeli army launched its attack on Iran last Friday morning, exposed once again the systemic inequality inherent in Israel’s civil defense infrastructure. According to a 2018 State Comptroller’s report, 60 out of 71 Arab municipalities in Israel have no public shelters. Tamra, a city of 37,000 residents, is one of them. For comparison, Safed, a Jewish city of similar size (about 42,000 residents), has 138 public shelters. Even Mitzpe Aviv, a nearby Jewish community with only 1,100 residents, has 13 public shelters.

Palestinians, including Raja Khatib (left), mourn the deaths of four members of the Khatib family killed in an Iranian missile attack in the Arab city of Tamra, northern Israel, June 17, 2025. (Oren Ziv)

At-home safe rooms (which are known in Hebrew as a “Mamad”, and considered less effective at withstanding blasts than larger public shelters) are few and far between in Arab towns and cities. Under Israeli law, safe rooms cannot be built in houses that were constructed without the necessary permit. Yet many Palestinian families in Israel are forced to build without permits due to discriminatory housing policies that make it almost impossible to build legally in Arab municipalities.

The result, according to the State Comptroller’s report, is that 46 percent of Palestinian citizens of Israel have no access to adequate protection from aerial attacks, compared to 26 percent of the general population.

Urban renewal projects, which require the building of safe rooms in new homes, could offer a partial solution — but according to the NGO Sikkuy-Aufoq, not a single urban renewal project was approved in an Arab town between 2010 and 2023, compared to more than 5,600 projects in Jewish communities. Thus, years of planning discrimination have turned into a direct threat to Palestinian lives in Israel.

To make matters worse, the government decided around a year ago to shut down an initiative established after October 7 to provide life-saving information and services to the Arab public in Israel during wartime. A collaboration between the Social Equality Ministry’s Authority for the Socioeconomic Development of Arab Society, the National Committee of Arab Mayors, and the Kafr Qassem Municipality, the initiative had received praise from the Home Front Command and was shown to be effective in research by civil society organizations, yet the government argued that there was no need to maintain a dedicated service for Palestinian citizens.

A young man from Tamra, who preferred not to be named, emphasized to +972 that Saturday’s tragedy was not the first and nor will it be the last. “A year ago, a woman was killed in nearby Shefa-‘Amr [when a rocket from Lebanon hit her home]. There are no public shelters like those in Jewish communities, and most houses are old without protected rooms. In Tamra, and in most Arab towns, the state delays the expansion of our communities, so there are fewer new neighborhoods and homes compared to Jewish towns, which are expanding almost daily.

A man at the scene of an Iranian ballistic missile strike in Tamra, northern Israel, June 15, 2025. (David Cohen/Flash90)

“Beyond that, you don’t have to be a military expert to understand that the air defense systems are designed to protect the Jewish municipalities,” he went on. “Sometimes an Arab town gets lucky if it falls under the defense coverage of a nearby Jewish city, but that’s generally not the case. From Shefa-‘Amr last year, to Tamra, Majd Al-Krum, Tarshiha, and other incidents, it’s clear: the state that ignores our deaths from organized crime also ignores our deaths from other causes.”

Mazzen Ghanaim, head of the National Committee of Arab Mayors, placed blame directly on the shoulders of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: “If this is the ‘New Middle East’ — we don’t want it.”

‘We will not be silent’

In the aftermath of the Khatib deaths, one mainstream Israeli TV channel resorted to victim-blaming — emphasizing that those killed were not inside a safe room (in response, Tamra’s mayor, Musa Abu Rumi, hit back: “The house was new and fortified, but it couldn’t withstand a missile carrying nearly 400kg of explosives, according to what the Home Front Command told us. The entire neighborhood was damaged.”).

Soon after, a video went viral showing young Israeli Jews cheering at the sight of missiles falling in Tamra, singing the common far-right refrain: “May your village burn.” While Netanyahu condemned the video, his media ally Yinon Magal seemed to justify it when he stated: “Not everyone in Tamra loves Israel.”

In response to complaints of racist incitement, including from Palestinian MK Ahmad Tibi, police announced that “the matter is under investigation,” but no arrests have been reported. In contrast, the previous day police arrested 17 youths from Umm Al-Fahem who had celebrated the first wave of Iranian missile attacks.

For the young man from Tamra, the double-standard is clear. “The story [of Jewish incitement against Palestinians] apparently isn’t even worth the police’s attention. And why would it be, when one of Israel’s senior journalists justifies the death of our daughters live on air? If the roles had been reversed, there’s no need to explain what would have happened.”

At the University of Haifa’s College of Law, students and faculty alike mourned the death of 20-year-old Shada Khatib. Attorney Abeer Baker, who was her teacher at the college, described Khatib as “a beloved, radiant, and promising student. One missile destroyed Shada’s dream and cut a thread from all of our souls. We will not be silent, and we will not stop fighting to bring to justice every filthy fascist who rejoiced over your death, over your family’s grief, and over our pain.”

Shada Khatib, right, with Abeer Baker, left. (Courtesy of Abeer Baker)

This effort to prosecute them, Baker emphasized, would be “part of Shada’s path, of the project she didn’t get to complete.” Indeed, she added, “Shada’s last wish was to volunteer with the Adalah Legal Center, and her last message to me was that she had sent her resume and hoped to become part of their team.

“Your name and voice will remain in my memory — and the memory of all of us — as a radiant symbol, a torch of wisdom that dreamed of becoming a voice against injustice, despite all the hardships.”

A version of this article was first published in Hebrew on Local Call. Read it here.

Baker Zoubi is a journalist from Kufr Misr currently living in Nazareth. Baker has been working in the field of journalism since 2010, initially as a reporter for local Arab media outlets, and later as an editor of the Bokra website. Today, he also works as a researcher and editor for television programs on the Makan and Musawa channels. He writes and posts on his Facebook page various opinion pieces on politics and social issues related to Palestinian society. Recently, he also started writing for Local Call.

Tags: Palestinian Citizens of Israel discrimination in Israel Racism in Israel Iran October 7 war bomb shelters

This article was downloaded from https://www.972mag.com/tamra-khatib-palestinians-israel-neglect-iran-missiles/ at 28 June 2025, 7:20 PM EDT.

Table of Contents

+972 Mag: 2025 Jun 27

All articles

Israel’s euphoric ‘victory’ over Iran is quickly giving way to disillusionment

Skating through rubble: The volunteers reclaiming joy for Gaza’s children

What the UAE hopes to gain from Israel’s growing isolation

12 days that brought the war home to Israelis

Why everything Israelis think they know about Iran is wrong

With Iran war as pretext, Israel suffocates the West Bank

Netanyahu’s Iran gambit aimed to realign the world behind Israel. It may backfire

Unprotected from Iranian missiles, Palestinians in Israel decry neglect